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Article 2

25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT TRILOGY:
REFLECTIONS ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SEATTLE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

The Summary Judgment Changes that Weren't
Remarks of Lee H. Rosenthal*
This Symposium has brought together scholars with a deep and
thorough knowledge of civil procedure in general and the history and
role of summary judgment in American state and federal courts in
particular. This is an unparalleled gathering of experts on the history of
the federal summary judgment rule and the jurisprudence that has
developed under it. The timing of the Symposium is interesting. It is
almost exactly two decades after the United States Judicial Conference,
the policymaking arm of the federal court system, rejected the
recommendation of its Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and its Committee on the Rules of Practice and
Procedure (generally referred to as the Standing Committee) to make
significant changes to Rule 56 in the wake of the trilogy decided in
1986: Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,' Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,2 and
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.3 Such a
rejection by the Judicial Conference of rule amendments recommended
by the Advisory Committee and the Standing Committee through the
* United States District Judge. Southern District of Texas. Houston Division. In addition to
her work as a district judge, Judge Rosenthal was a member of the Judicial Conference's
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure from 2001 to 2007, serving as its
chair from 2003 to 2007. She served as the chair of the Committee on the Rules of Practice and
Procedure, which oversees and coordinates the work of the Advisory Committees on the Rules of
Civil Procedure. Criminal Procedure. Appellate Procedure, Bankruptcy Procedure, and Evidence,
from 2007 to 2011. Professor Daniel R. Coquillette. the J. Donald Monan, S.J., University
Professor at Boston College and the Charles Warren Visiting Professor of American Legal
History at Harvard Law School; Professor Steven S. Gensler. the Welcome D. and W. DeVier
Pierson Professor of Law at the University of Oklahoma College of Law; Judge Mark R. Kravitz;
and Professor Ed Brunet, the Henry J. Casey Professor of Law at Lewis & Clark Law School,
commented on earlier versions of this Article. and Andrea Kuperman. Chief Counsel to the Rules
Committees, commented and provided invaluable insight and assistance. The views and errors in
this Article are Judge Rosenthal's.
1. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
2. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
3. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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Rules Enabling Act4 does not happen often.5 The changes to Rule 56
that did not happen in 1992 were followed in 2007 by a change that did
happen but was reversed three years later. It was not until 2010 that
Rule 56 was substantially amended and the procedures for bringing and
litigating summary judgment motions were changed significantly for the
first time in forty years. And even then, what is perhaps most notable
about the changes that were made are the ones that weren't. I want to
explore, briefly, some of the changes that weren't made over the last
decades and see what they tell us about both summary judgment and the
rulemaking process.
I will not attempt to catalogue every idea that was raised and rejected
throughout those decades. That would be very long and very dull.
Instead, I will focus on the proposed amendments that almost became
part of the summary judgment rule, proposals that did get through a
significant part of the exacting Rules Enabling Act process but
ultimately were rejected. I want to look at what is on the cutting-room
floor to understand better what is in the text.
In 1987, the year after the trilogy was decided, the Civil Rules
Advisory Committee took up Rule 56. According to the then-reporter
4. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2077. There are five Advisory Committees-for the Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and Rules of Evidence-and the Standing Committee, which provides coordination
and oversight. Under the Enabling Act and related statutes and Judicial Conference procedures.
the advisory committees recommend that the Standing Committee approve proposed amendments
for a period of public comment. If the Standing Committee approves, a lengthy period of public
comment follows. After that period, the advisory committee considers the comments, decides
whether to proceed and, if so, whether to make revisions. If the advisory committee decides to
make revisions, and if the revisions are not so substantial as to require republication, it decides
whether to recommend that the Standing Committee approve the proposed revised amendments
and transmit them to the Judicial Conference. If the Judicial Conference approves the proposals,
they are transmitted to the Supreme Court. If the Court approves the changes, they are
transmitted to Congress by May 1 of the year in which a proposed rule is to become effective. If
Congress does not affirmatively act to defeat, change, or defer the proposals in what is usually a
seven-month period for consideration, they become law on December I of that year.
5. See Griffin B. Bell. Chilton Davis Varner & Hugh Q. Gottschalk, Automatic Disclosure in
Discovery The Rush to Reform. 27 GA. L. REV. 1. 23-24 (1992) ("Although the Judicial
Conference may reject proposed rules or require further revision, the 'general pattern in recent
years' has been for the Conference to approve the Standing Committee's recommendations.").
One of the few examples of the Judicial Conference rejecting a recommendation of the Standing
Committee was the 1996 rejection of the Standing Committee's recommendation to return to a
twelve-person jury in civil trials. See STANDING COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE,
MINUTES, JANUARY 9-10, at 2 (1997). available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/janl997.pdf ("Judge
Stotler
reported that
all
rule
recommendations submitted by the committee to the Judicial Conference at its September 1996
session had been approved by the Conference, except for the proposed amendments to FED. R.
Civ. P. 48, relating to 12-person civil juries.").
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to the Committee, Professor Paul Carrington, the Advisory Committee
viewed these Supreme Court decisions as revising Rule 56 to permit
district judges to render summary judgment more freely than the
Court's previous interpretations of the rule's text seemed to allow. To
quote Professor Arthur Miller, an earlier reporter to the Advisory
Committee, "Celotex has made it easier to make the motion, and
Anderson and Matsushita have increased the chances that it will be
granted." 6 The Reporter and others believed that the Court had
expanded the standard more than the rule text seemed to permit.7 As a
result, members of the Advisory Committee believed the rule text was
misleading.8 Some of these same sentiments are echoed in the wave of
critical reaction to the trilogy. 9 Much of the criticism sounded the
theme that as expanded and widened, Rule 56 transformed district
judges into pretrial factfinders.1 0 As Professor Miller stated, the result
was the "genial anarchy of trial court discretion."" The criticism also
sounded the theme that the Supreme Court had bypassed the rulemaking
process and changed Rule 56 by judicial decision rather than through
the Rules Enabling Act. 12
6. Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion,"
"Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Clichis Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?. 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982. 1041 (2003).
7. See Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on
Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 645 (2010) ("The Advisory Committee viewed those decisions [in
the summary judgment trilogy] as revising the rule to permit district judges to render summary
judgments more freely than the Court's previous interpretations of the rule's text seemed to
allow and, in many minds, including mine, more freely than the text of the rule could
reasonably be said to intend." (footnote omitted)).
8. See id. at 646 ("The Advisory Committee believed that, among other effects, the trilogy's
widening of the summary judgment procedure rendered Rule 56 misleading.").
9. See, e.g., Daniel P. Collins, Note, Summary Judgment and Circumstantial Evidence, 40
STAN. L. REv. 491. 492 (1988) (arguing that the Court wrote an ambiguous opinion in Matsushita
Electric that could be read to give judges varying standards to determine motions for summary
judgment); see also Jack H. Friedenthal & Joshua E. Gardner, Judicial Discretion to Deny
Summary Judgment in the Era ofManagerialJudging,31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 91, 96 (2002) ("The
most significant sources of the confusion [on the propriety of the use of discretion to deny
summary judgment] stem from the text of Rule 56 itself and from language in two of the three
opinions in the Court's summary judgment trilogy."): Samuel Issacharoff & George Lowenstein,
Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 93 (1990) (arguing that the
trilogy facilitates the process for defendants to make a summary judgment motion and increases
their likelihood of success, while at the same time burdening plaintiffs with arguing the merits of
their case at an earlier stage in the proceedings).
10. Miller, supra note 6, at 1045.
11. Id. at1134.
12. See id. at 1029 ("[T]he Court's majority has even been criticized for effectively amending
Rule 56 by judicial fiat [through the summary judgment trilogy] rather than through the procedure
prescribed by the Rules Enabling Act ....
); see also Carrington, supra note 7, at 648 ("The
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The Advisory Committee continued its Rule 56 work over the next
four years. This was not its only concern; there was other difficult work
on the agenda as well. 13 The Committee meeting minutes for this
period are both short and sketchy.14 But the 1987 and 1989 minutes do
show some of the major themes in the Rule 56 work: to link it with Rule
50, being recast from motion for directed verdict to motion for
judgment as a matter of law; to clarify the use of summary disposition
of an issue that did not resolve a claim in its entirety; and to refer to the
burdens of production and persuasion as presented in Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby.15
premise of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 that still governs the Judicial Conference is that courts
of first instance should be bound to adhere to preexisting procedure rules crafted by the
Conference and its committees but subject to Supreme Court approval and congressional
acquiescence. just as they are bound to respect and enforce congressional legislation. The
Supreme Court seems to have departed from that premise in the 1986 trilogy; it was seen by
many to have rewritten Rule 56 in a moment of judicial activism.") Jeffrey W. Stempel. A
Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed
Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 99 (1988) ("These cases [in the
trilogy], particularly Liberty Lobby. effectively rewrote Rule 56 without benefit of the procedures
for amending the Federal Rules required by the Rules Enabling Act of 1934."). Professor Miller
noted, however, that this viewpoint "appropriately" had "few adherents." Miller, supra note 6, at
1029.
13. Some of the issues and proposals the Civil Rules Committee considered during the same
period were proposed amendments to Rule 51 to add tiexibility to the timing of the court's jury
instruction, gender-neutralizing amendments to the Civil Rules, nearly complete rewriting of Rule
4 on service, proposed changes to Rule 45 on subpoenas, revising the rules on jury size, proposed
amendments to address the reopening of the period to appeal if the appellant did not receive
notice of entry of judgment, the timing of scheduling orders, and the proper method of claiming
privilege.
14. The brevity retlects a considered choice. In the April 1989 meeting, the Committee
discussed the problem of minute taking and agreed not to elaborate the minutes "beyond what has
been the custom of the Committee, it being the sense of the Committee that it would be
undesirable to create another level of legislative history to be explored by persons seeking to
understand the text of the rule." ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, MINUTES, APRIL 27 29,
1989, at 47 (1989), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/
Minutes/CVO4-1989-min.pdf. The Committee has softened that approach. as evidenced by the
detail of the minutes of more recent meetings, relying on thoughtful and precise descriptions to
inform the reader's understanding.
15. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, MINUTES, FEB. 12-13. 1987. at 3 (1987).
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CVO2-1987min.pdf ("The Reporter was directed to include in the notes, at least, some reference to the
problem of degrees of persuasion as presented in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby."); id. at 4 ("The
Committee expressed the inclination to see all the changes in Rule 56 in place, and also to
consider the possible changes in Rule 50 in relation to those in Rule 56."); ADVISORY COMM. ON
CIVIL RULES. MINUTES. APR. 27-29. 1989, at 55 (1989), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CVO4-1989-min.pdf
("'Burden of production of
evidence or proof was employed over the protest of those who thought the phrase redundant.");
id. ("The problem of the party not having the burden was addressed and the text clearly
conformed to the Committee's understanding that such a party should be able to point to the
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A draft was published in 1989 that substantially rewrote Rule 56.16
The purpose was to "enlarge the availability of the device of summary
establishment of fact"; to "provide for the summary establishment of
law to control further proceedings"; to "assure a party opposing
summary action of reasonable opportunity for discovery"; to "integrate
[Rule 56] with Rules 50 and 52"; and to provide guidance on
"troublesome issues" under the current rule. 17 In September 1990, the
proposed amendments were withdrawn because of the substantial
number of comments received. There was particular concern over the
device of "summary establishment" of fact and of law.1 8
In August 1991, the proposed amendments were republished. Again,
there were many public comments received. The themes from the
public comments are familiar because the Committees heard similar
reactions after another proposal to revise Rule 56 was published in
2008. Some thought the changes were too radical. Some thought they
were too inconsequential. There was concern over the lack of judicial
control of excessive summary judgment motions. There was concern
that judges were not ruling on summary judgment motions that were
filed. And there was concern that judges were granting such motions by
finding facts that should have been left for the jurors to determine.
Many were unhappy with the existing rule-"The present rule is

absence of probative material on the other side and thereby satisfy the requirements for a
successful motion."); COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, MINUTES, JULY 17-18,
1989, at 13 (1989), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/
Minutes/ST July_1989.pdf ("Dean Carrington noted that one of the purposes of the proposed
amendment to Rule 56 was to enable the court to confine discovery by deciding certain issues of
fact and law at an early stage in the proceedings." (emphasis added)).
16. See Memorandum from Judge John F. Grady, Chair. Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules. to
Judge Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Chair. Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure. Report of
the Civil Rules Advisory Comm., at i, vi vii (June 12, 1989), available at http://www.uscourts
.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV06-1989.pdf

(requesting

approval

for

publication of a "substantial package of amendments." and describing the proposed changes to
Rule 56 and noting that "[t]his rule would be substantially re-written").
17. Id. at vi vii; cf COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, AGENDA BOOK FOR JAN.
14-15, 2008 MEETING 194 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd
Policies/rules/Agendao20Books/ST2008-Ol.pdf (noting that in the proposal that led up to the
1992 proposed amendments, "[t]he initial effort . . . was to integrate Rule 56 more directly with
judgment as a matter of law, emphasizing the identity of standards").
18. See CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., MINUTES, FEB. 21-23. 1991, at 6 (1991), available
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CVO2-1991-min.pdf
at
(noting that a new draft of the proposed amendments differed from the previously published draft
"in the visibility of the device of summary resolution of issues by 'establishment' of law and
fact," and noting that "the establishment device had drawn the flack").
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unreadable except by one informed by substantial case law."-but
divided over what should take its place.19
At its spring 1992 meeting, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee
approved a re-revised rule and recommended that the Standing
Committee approve its transmission to the Judicial Conference. 20 A
proposal to amend Rule 50 had been made for the purpose of linking it
to the proposed text of Rule 56.21 The Rule 50 proposal was approved
and had become law earlier, but the Rule 56 proposal presented to the
Standing Committee in 1992, then to the Judicial Conference, had a
different result.
The Rule 56 proposal revised the summary judgment standard as it
had been developed through the case law. As revised, it replaced the
language of the existing rule-summary judgment "shall be rendered"
upon a showing that no genuine dispute of material fact existed and that
the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law-with a
statement that:
(a) Of Claims, Defenses, and Issues. The court without a trial may
enter summary judgment for or against a claimant with respect to a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may summarily
determine a defense, or may summarily determine an issue
substantially affecting but not wholly dispositive of a claim or defense
if summary adjudication as to the claim, defense, or issue is warranted
as a matter of law because of facts not genuinely in dispute....
(b) Facts Not Genuinely In Dispute. A fact is not genuinely in
dispute if . .. on the basis of the evidence shown to be available for
use at a trial, or the demonstrated lack thereof, and the burden of

19.

See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES. MINUTES, MAY 11, 1992, at 14 (1992). available

http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CVO4-1992-min.pdf
at
(discussing the various issues that the judges on the Advisory Committee had with the proposed
amendments).
20. Cf Memorandum from Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chair, Advisory Comm. on Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, to Judge Robert E. Keeton, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Comm.. app. A, at 119-29 (May 1.
1992), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV5-1992
.pdf (presenting proposed revisions to Rule 56).
21. Cf Memorandum from Hon. John F. Grady. Chair. Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to
Hon. Joseph F. Weis, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure at 61 (June 19.
1990), reprinted in REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE RULES OF

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE. app. B, att.. at 61 (1990). available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-1990.pdf (draft committee note accompanying the
proposed amendment to Rule 50, stating: "The term judgment as a matter of law' [being
substituted for 'direction of verdict' in Rule 50] is an almost equally familiar term and appears in
the text of Rule 56"; however, noting that Rule 50 and Rule 56 remain separate to show the
difference between pre-trial and post-trial motions).
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production or persuasion and standards applicable thereto, a party
would be entitled at trial to a favorable judgment or determination
with respect thereto as a matter of law under Rule 50.22
The Committee Note made clear that the revision was intended to
"enhance the utility of the summary judgment procedure" and to
establish a "single and consistent standard, as [it] has been developed
through case law, for determining when summary adjudication is
permitted." 2 3 The revision attempted to incorporate and restate the
trilogy and to codify the judicial discretion to deny summary judgment
even if the standard for granting it is met. 2 4 The Standing Committee
viewed this aspect of the proposed rule with concern that "may" sent a
signal that the court has no duty to respond to summary judgment
motions. 25 The Committee Note attempted to clarify the limited nature
of the discretion to deny a motion:
When these standards are met, the court should ordinarily enter the
appropriate summary disposition. However, the court is not always
required to enter a summary adjudication that would be permissible
under the rule. Despite the apparently mandatory language of the
former rule, case law has recognized a measure of discretion in the
trial court to deny summary judgments in a variety of circumstances
. . . . The purpose of the revision is not to discourage summary
judgment, but to bring the language of the rule into conformity with
this practice. 26
The Advisory Committee and the Standing Committee thought that
the extent of this discretion to deny summary adjudication depended on
whether the requested summary judgment was on a nondispositive
22. See Memorandum from Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman. Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules to
Hon. Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, att. A, at
170-71 (May 1. 1992), reprinted in REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON RULES
OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, app. E (Sept. 1992) [hereinafter SEPT. 1992 STANDING COMM.

REPORT] (emphasis added), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
rules/Reports/ST09-1992.pdf (regarding facts not genuinely in dispute).
23. See id. att. A. at 179 (describing the purpose of the revision).
24. See id. at 180 (Committee Note stating: "When these standards [set out in the proposed
rule] are met, the court should ordinarily enter the appropriate summary disposition. However,
the court is not always required to enter a summary adjudication that would be permissible under
the rule. Despite the apparently mandatory language of the former rule. case law has recognized
a measure of discretion in the trial court to deny summary judgment in a variety of
circumstances."); id. att. A. at 181 ("The standards stated in this subdivision for determining
whether a fact is genuinely in dispute are essentially those developed over time, culminating in
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242
(1986).").
25. Cf id. att. B. at 12 ("Some object to the language affording the trial court with some
discretion not to enter a summary adjudication . . . under the rule.").
26. Id. att. A. at 180.
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issue, or would resolve the entire case, and on the substantive law. 2 7
This same debate over whether a court has discretion to deny summary
judgment when the showing to grant it has been made was renewed
with respect to amendments proposed to be effective in 2007 and again
with respect to amendments proposed to be effective in 2010, with a
different result.
The amendments proposed in 1992 were also intended to establish
"national procedures .

.

. with the purpose of eliminating the need for

local rules on this subject." 28 This goal, which was one of the reasons
for beginning work on what became the 2010 amendments to Rule 56,
was reflected in the 1992 proposal that summary judgment motions had
to include separately numbered paragraphs reciting the specific facts
asserted to be not genuinely in dispute and on the basis of which the
judgment or determination should be granted, with pinpoint citations to
the record. 2 9 The response had to "indicate the extent to which the
asserted facts recited in the motion are claimed to be false or in genuine
dispute," with pinpoint citations to the record, and to "recite in
separately numbered paragraphs any additional facts that preclude
summary adjudication, citing the materials evidencing those facts." 30 if
a party failed to challenge an asserted fact, that could be treated as an
admission of that fact. 3 1 The argument had to be made in a separate
memorandum. 32
The 1992 proposed amendments addressed partial dispositions as
summary determinations, not judgments, and included the district
judges' single favorite rule. That is the anti-ferret rule, making clear
that the district judge does not have to search through the record for
evidence that might be buried deep within. Instead, it is the parties'
obligation to tell the district court what parts of the record merit
consideration. The "court is required to consider only those evidentiary
materials called to its attention" through the pinpoint citations. 33
27. Id. att. B, at 12 ("The revision, however, merely brings the language of the rule (currently
worded as mandatory) into conformity with court decisions. These decisions recognize the need
for some discretion, particularly with respect to issues that are not wholly dispositive of the
claims made by or against a party.").
28. Id. att. A. at 179 (proposed committee note).
29. See id. att. A. at 172 (proposed revisions to Rule 56(c)(1)).
30. See id att. A, at 173 (proposed revisions to Rule 56(c)(2)).
31. See id (proposed revisions to Rule 56(c)(2)).
32. See id att. A, at 174 (proposed revisions to Rule 56(c)(4)).
33. See id. att. A. at 177 (proposed revisions to Rule 56(e)(2)). This rule is also known as the
anti-truffle-pig rule. See United States v. Dunkel. 927 F.2d 955. 956 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Judges are
not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.").
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In sending the proposal to the Standing Committee with a
recommendation for approval, the Reporter noted, with some
understatement, that it was "moderately controversial."3 4 Some were
"apprehensive that any change in the rule might diminish the utility of
summary judgment procedures." 35 Others opposed "the amendment
because it incorporates into the rule the principles enunciated in
Supreme Court decisions that they believe were wrongly decided." 3 6
And some objected to the language affording the trial court some
discretion not to enter a summary judgment that might be permitted
under the rule. 37 That provision drew a dissent in the Advisory Rules
Committee from a member who "would have preferred that the text of
the rule indicate that summary judgment is mandatory when
warranted." 38 But even with this, the Advisory Committee unanimously
recommended adoption of the proposed amendment of Rule 56.39
The proposal went up to the Judicial Conference and met defeat. It is
useful to note that the package the Judicial Conference wrestled with
during those years was large.
It was an interesting time for
proceduralists, as is the present.
The December 1992 minutes of the Standing Committee meeting
described the Judicial Conference's rejection of Rule 56.
Some
members of the Conference had argued that the summary judgment rule
was working well in its present form and that judges had become
familiar with the language of the rule and the current case law. But the
suspicion was that the rejection had more to do with the trilogy and less
to do with the proposed rule. "[S]ome members seemed not to like the
case law on Rule 56 and might not have wanted to enshrine it in the
rule." 40 According to Professor Steven Gensler, who has written
insightfully on this topic, legend has it that the proposal came under
attack from both those who liked and disliked the trilogy. 4 1 Those who
liked it did not want to make changes. Those who disliked it did not
want to enshrine it.4 2 And there was perhaps another problem as well.
34. See SEPT. 1992 STANDING COMM. REPORT, supra note 22, att. B, at 12.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40.

COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, MINUTES, DEC. 17-19, 1992, at 2 (1992),

available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/ST12-1992-min
.pdf.
41. Steven S. Gensler, Afust, Should,Shall, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1139, 1152 (2010).
42. Id.
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Writing later about the Civil Rules Committee's work during the time in
which he served as its reporter, Professor Carrington wrote: "In fairness,
none of us were sure we had it right." 4 3 The entire proposed amended
rule went down to defeat. This is the first major change that wasn't-a
restated standard that codified the trilogy and granted clear discretion to
judges to deny summary judgment.
The guidance the Civil Rules Committee took from the 1992 effort to
amend Rule 56 can perhaps best be seen by looking to the next two sets
of proposed amendments to the rule that also ended up on the cuttingroom floor. Both sets occurred in 2010, but the run-up started in 2007
when the Civil Rules were thoroughly edited to be clearer, simpler,
more consistent, modern in expression, and formatted for easier
reading-without changing the substantive meaning of any rule. This
was the extension of the so-called "style project" to the Civil Rules. 44
The Appellate Rules were "restyled" in 1997, and the Criminal Rules in
2002. The restyled Evidence Rules, the fourth set to be "restyled,"
became effective on December 1, 2011.
Professor Steven Gensler has written the definitive work on the
Committee's decision in 2007 to change one word in the language
defining the standard for granting summary judgment, and the decision
three years later-which in rulemaking terms is a nanosecond-to
reverse the change. In his 2010 article, "Must, Should, Shall," Professor
Gensler describes the change in 2007 from the language that had existed
for seventy years-that summary judgment "shall be rendered" on a
showing that no genuine dispute of material fact existed and that the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 45 In 2007,
Rule 56 was amended to provide that summary judgment "should be
rendered" on that showing. There were two parts to the decision to
make this change. First, the decision to move away from "shall" was
the result of the style project. The style conventions strongly disfavored

43. Carrington. supra note 7, at 647.
44. As the Committee's reporter at the time of the "style project" explained, the goal was "to
translate present text into clear language that does not change the meaning." Edward H. Cooper,
Restyling the Civil Rules: Clarity Without Change. 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1761, 1761 (2004):
see also Joseph Kimble, Lessons in Draftingfrom the New FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 12
SCRIBES J. OF LEGAL WRITING 25, 25 26 (2008 2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Style/o20Resources/Lessons%/o2Oin%/o20Drafting.pdf (discussing
the "restyling" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Memorandum from Professor Joseph
Kimble to All Readers, Guiding Principles for Restyling the Civil Rules (Feb. 21, 2005)
[hereinafter Style Guidelines Memo]. available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd
Policies/rules/Style0%20Resources/GuidingPrinciples.pdf.
45. Gensler, supra note 41, at 1142-49.
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"shall" for good reasons. 4 6 It is inherently ambiguous. Depending on
the context, it can, and does, mean "must," "should," or "may." And it
is a word that is used in written legal documents, not in modern spoken
or plainly written English. The style project's goals of having the rules
say what they mean and mean what they say, and shedding archaic
expression, demanded that "shall" be consigned to the vocabulary scrap
heap. And once that decision was made, it became self-fulfilling
because the other major goal of the style project was consistency.
Leaving "shall" in one or two places and nowhere else was inconsistent
with that goal.
The style project engaged in a laborious, but fascinating, task. For
every "shall" in the rules, teams of professors, reporters, and committee
members pored over cases and treatises to divine from the use and
context what the proper translation would be. Professor Joseph Kimble,
the style consultant to the Standing Committee, recounts that there were
almost five hundred "shalls" in the Civil Rules before December 1,
2007.47 For most of these five hundred "shalls," it was easy to decide,
based on context and case law applying the particular rule, that the
"shall" was meant in the sense of a command and to substitute "must."
That happened 375 times. 4 8 In other cases, again based on context and
case law, it was easy to decide that "shall" was permissive and to
substitute some form of "may."
And in yet other cases, a soft
imperative "should" was clearly called for. 4 9
Rule 56, however, defied easy translation. One reason was that two
of the Supreme Court cases in the trilogy had inconsistent language on
this very point. The opinion in Anderson stated: "Neither do we suggest
that the trial courts should act other than with caution in granting
summary judgment or that the trial court may not deny summary
judgment in a case where there is reason to believe that the better course

46. See Style Guidelines Memo, supra note 44, at xviii ("Shall is notorious for its misuse and
slipperiness in legal documents.").
Professor Kimble explained that the style project
"[b]anish[ed] shall." Id. He explained:
The restyled civil rules, like the restyled appellate and criminal rules, use must instead
of shall. Shall is notorious for its misuse and slipperiness in legal documents. No
surprise, then, that the Committee changed shall to may in several instances, to should
in several other instances, and to the simple present tense when the rule involves no
obligation or permission ....
Id.
47. Kimble. supra note 44, at 79.
4 8. Id.
49. See id. at 81-83 (showing a comparative table of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure using
"shall" versus "may").
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would be to proceed to a full trial."5 0 By contrast, the opinion in
Celotex stated:
[T]he plain language ... mandates the entry of summary judgment,
after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party
who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial.5 1
In the failed 1992 proposal, the Civil Rules and Standing Rules
Committees had changed "shall" to "may," which is clearly a word
conveying discretion.
The proposed Committee Note, however,
conveyed the standard of a soft imperative.
When these standards are met, the court should ordinarily enter the
appropriate summary disposition. However, the court is not always
required to enter a summary adjudication that would be permissible
under the rule. Despite the apparently mandatory language of the
former rule, case law has recognized a measure of discretion in the
trial court to deny summary judgments in a variety of circumstances. 52
To foreshadow a later term prominent in rulemaking debates, the
meaning was "context-specific."
Context-specific variations in
meaning do not make rule-writing easy.
The 1992 Rules Committees chose "may" as the controlling word,
changing the standard. The lore is, of course, that the change in the
standard defeated the proposal. This history of years of work without a
rule change to show for it was well known to the Rules Committees
when they faced the style choice in the years leading up to the 2007
style revision: if not "shall," what? The case law was both inconsistent
and varied. 53 The variation depended on the substantive area, on
50. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
51. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
52. SEPT. 1992 STANDING CoMM. REPORT. supra note 22. att. A, at 180.
53. Compare Lacks Indus., Inc. v. McKechnie Vehicle Components USA, Inc., No. 20081167, 2008 WL 4962687, at *2, *5 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 21, 2008) (affirming a denial of the plaintiff s
motion for summary judgment on patent validity, noting that it would not 'disturb a trial courts
denial of summary judgment unless [it found] that the court [had] indeed abused its discretion,"'
and that "the trial court has discretion to deny a motion for summary judgment" (quoting Little
Six, Inc. v. United States, 280 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002))), with Warner-Lambert Co. v.
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.. 418 F.3d 1326, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating "[s]ummary judgment
must be granted" if the Rule 56(c) standard is met (emphasis added)), and Starns v. Health
Profls, Ltd., No. 04-1143, 2008 WL 268590, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2008) ("Summary
[judgment] is not a discretionary remedy. If the plaintiff lacks enough evidence, summary
[judgment] must be granted." (quoting Jones v. Johnson, 26 F.3d 727, 728 (7th Cir. 1994) (per
curiam))). See also Memorandum from Andrea Kuperman to Judge Mark R. Kravitz, Discretion
to Deny Summary Judgment (Feb. 19, 2008, as supplemented Jan. 25. 2009). available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%/2056%/2Omemo.pdf (describing
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whether the summary judgment sought was claim-dispositive or not,
and on the circuit law that applied.5 4 The Advisory Rules Committee
pieced all this together and concluded that the 1992 version had been
correct in its analysis but had picked the wrong word. "May," which
conveyed broad discretion, was not what the 1992 Committee Note
described. Instead, the soft imperative "should" fit well. So the change
from "shall" to "should" was made in 2007, as part of the style project.
Although there was a great deal of comment on the revised proposed
style rules from bench, bar, and academy, including from those who
know this history well, there was only one comment directed to this
change. 5 5 There was no significant argument that this changed
substantive meaning, which was forbidden by the style project.
In 2008, the Advisory Committee published an extensive set of
proposed amendments to Rule 56. This set of proposed amendments
was the daughter of the style project, which painfully revealed the
disconnect between the practice of bringing and litigating summary
judgment motions on the one hand, and the rule text on the other. Such
a disconnect was not surprising. Not only had the case law interpreting
Rule 56 changed with and under the trilogy, making summary judgment
motions both more frequent and more important, but civil litigation had
changed in other ways that also affected summary judgment motions.
To summarize a few of the many large changes in a few words, the
number of trials continues to decline in both state and federal courts.
More cases are resolved by means other than trial, including by motions
varying case law on discretion to deny summary judgment).
54. See generally Memorandum from Andrea Kuperman to Judge Mark R. Kravitz, supra note
53 (describing varying case law throughout the circuits on discretion to deny summary
judgment); id. at 2 (noting that the one appellate case that expressly disapproved of the exercise
of discretion to deny summary judgment did so in the context of qualified immunity, and that
"[b]ecause qualified immunity is a unique area of substantive law with an underlying policy
favoring early resolution, the appellate case disapproving of discretionary denials in that context
may not mean that district courts lack discretion to deny summary judgment in other contexts").
See also Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 9, at 104 (noting that federal courts are split over
whether judges are required to grant summary judgment if it is technically appropriate); id. at
104-06 (describing several circumstances in which courts have found it appropriate to exercise
discretion to deny a properly supported motion for summary judgment, such as complex cases
"just not ripe for summary relief," including instances where "the issues presented in the motion
were intertwined with issues not proper for summary adjudication").
55. See Memorandum from Stephen B. Burbank & Gregory P. Joseph to the Comm. on Rules
of Practice and Procedure, Restyled Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure 4 (Oct. 24, 2005). available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/CV%/20Conments%/2O2005/05-CV022.pdf (submitting comments on the proposed restyled rules on behalf of a group of eleven law
professors and ten practitioners. and noting that there is bound to be disagreement as to the
appropriate term used to replace "shall" in some of the rules (but not noting any specific concerns
with the Rule 56 change)).
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practice. Discovery has become more complicated, in part because of
changes in information technology that turned it into e-discovery, and in
part because discovery is in many cases focused on creating evidence to
support or oppose summary judgment motions. By way of example of
the disconnect, the rule text did not refer at all to motions for partial
summary judgment, despite the importance and prevalence of such
motions. The degree of the disconnect was revealed by the large
number and variety of local rules that directed lawyers on how to move
for, oppose, and litigate motions for summary judgment. Such a
patchwork of local rules in an area that the national rules occupy may,
and in this case did, indicate deficiencies in the national rule. This
disconnect between rule text and practice could not be fixed in the style
project because it would change substantive meaning. The 2007
summary judgment rule, clarified and simplified by the style project,
was nonetheless, as one Committee member stated, a "wreck." 5 6
The 2008 proposal to revise the summary judgment rule that was
published for comment retained the use of "should" and flagged for
comment whether that was in fact the right word to state the standard
for granting summary judgment when the criteria for doing so were met.
The proposal was met with vigorous and numerous comments. The
proponents of using "must"-that is, of requiring a judge to grant
summary judgment whenever the requirements were met, with no
discretion or flexibility-argued that the rule of law itself was
threatened if judges could deny summary judgment to parties who had
made the necessary showing to obtain it. 57 Many echoed the complaint
56. See CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., MINUTES, OCT. 27-28. 2005. at 27 (2005). available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV1 1-2005-min.pdf
(practitioner's comments).
57. See, e.g., HearingBefore the Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules 89 (Feb. 2, 2009) (testimony
of Mary Massaron Ross), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/
CV02-2009-tr.pdf ("When you try to explain to a client that there isn't any genuine issue of
material fact . . . but nevertheless the judge can deny it and then there's no standard, that
undermines respect for the rule of law."); HearingBefore the Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules 93
(Nov. 17. 2009) (testimony of Thomas Gottschalk). available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Transcript II1708.pdf ("[I]f a litigant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law, it must be granted. There is no justice in a system that doesn't grant that."); see
also ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES. AGENDA BOOK FOR APR. 20-21, 2009. at 124 (2009).

available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%/o20Books/Civil/
CV2009-04.pdf (summarizing the comments of Claudia D. McCarron, Esq.: "If 'shall' was
ambiguous. it should be replaced by 'must.' 'Should' will mean an increase in the number of
cases in which discretion is exercised to deny summary judgment; facing the cost of moving,
'fewer meritorious motions will be filed."); id. at 125 (summarizing the comments of Debra
Tedeschi Herron. Esq.: "'When properly supported. summary judgment must be granted as it
lessens the exorbitant costs of litigation and restores faith in the juridical system.'); id
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about earlier efforts to amend Rule 56, that the bigger problem was
judges simply not ruling on summary judgment motions or denying
valid motions, either out of reluctance to reach the result or out of hope
that uncertainty would facilitate settlement.5 8
The proponents of
"should" as the standard-the soft imperative recognizing that judges
ought to grant summary judgment when the criteria for doing are
satisfied, but not when the support is thin or there is no inefficiency in
developing a fuller record at trial-argued that access to courts and the
interests of justice were threatened if judges were stripped of the
discretion to deny summary judgment when it was technically
justifiable but fairness supported a fuller presentation. 5 9
The
(summarizing the comments of Stephen G. Morrison, Esq.: "The 'unbounded discretion'
conferred by 'should' 'could result in parts of the case, or the entire case, being tried to a jury
when it never should have made it that far.'
'Must' will promote the most efficient and
inexpensive manner of providing justice."); id at 127 (summarizing the comments of Keith B.
O'Connell, Esq.: '"Must' ought to replace 'should.' 'Should' has never meant 'shall,' and 'will
render the rule both under-utilized and ineffective."): ef HearingBefore the Advisory Comm. on
Civil Rules 109 (Jan. 14, 2009) (testimony of G. Edward Pickle), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/FedCtHearing01 1409.pdf (explaining
the need for a mandatory standard because "uniformity is absolutely critical" so that the same
standard is applied everywhere).
58. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, MINUTES, APR. 7-8, 2008, at 3 (2008), available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CVO4-2008-min.pdf
(summarizing the comments made by various participants); see also ADVISORY COMM.. APR. 2021, 2009, supra note 57, at 125 (summarizing the comments of Hon. Frank H. Easterbrook:
"Some judges prefer to deny. despite the absence of genuine dispute as to any material fact.
because at least one party will be satisfied by the jury's verdict, both parties will appreciate being
heard, and trial spares the need to decide the motion. But the party who shows there is no
genuine dispute should not have to bear the costs of trial, nor should other parties in the trial
queue have to wait longer."); id. at 136 (summarizing the comments of Stephen Pate, Esq.:
'[J]udges are reluctant to rule on summary judgment motions, even though it's a situation
involving a contract which involves matters of law.'. . . 'Must' will also protect against judges
who use summary-judgment as a settlement tool." (alteration in original)): Hearing Before the
Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules 124 (Nov. 17, 2008) (testimony of Stephen G. Morrison),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Transcript 111708.pdf
("[1]t would be grossly unfair for the U.S. Judicial Conference Rules Committee to reach a
conclusion that judges should punt [on a summary-judgment motion] when it's too hard and too
time-consuming."); ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, MINUTES, APR. 13-14. 1992. at 14
(1992). available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV041992-min.pdf ("Mr. Linder argued that the revision was viewed as too radical, but did not reach
the right problem, which is that motions are frequently not ruled on.").
59. Cf ADVISORY COMM., APR. 20-21, 2009, supra note 57. at 127-28 (summarizing the
comments of Thomas J. Crane, Esq.: "I am strongly opposed to making the grant of summary
judgment mandatory in certain cases."'); id at 130 (summarizing the comments of Professor Suja
A. Thomas: 'Should' is appropriate 'because courts should be given discretion in tough cases...
. Indeed, judges in the same case often disagree on what the evidence shows and thus whether
summary judgment should be granted.'"); id. at 131 (summarizing the comments of Professor
Eric Schnapper: "'Should' is correct. 'It is entirely common for the evidence and contentions of
the parties to be somewhat different at trial than they were at summary judgment.... [T]hese

486

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 43

proponents of "should" echoed the complaints heard in earlier
rulemaking efforts that judges were too willing to grant summary
judgment to "disfavored" categories of litigants and that if judges were
required to do so whenever the technical criteria were met, such
litigants would be even more disadvantaged. 60 It was a wonderful
debate. Dozens of witnesses weighed in and many written comments
were submitted.61 The upshot was to revert to "shall." 62 That is, to
undo the style change after only three years.
The Rule 56 text had gone from "shall," to a proposal for "may," to
"should," and back to "shall." The reason for reverting to "shall" was
the conclusion that the decision to change had itself violated a tenet of
the style project. That tenet was to leave "sacred phrases," which had
become so laden with nuanced meaning from case law that to change
the words would inevitably change the substantive meaning.63 The

differences would at times lead the district judge to conclude that the nature of the future trial
record is insufficiently clear to warrant summary judgment. In addition, a judge considering a
summary judgment motion may reasonably conclude that he or she does not understand the
factual issues as well as he or she would at the end of a trial.'); Hearing Before the Advisory
Comm. on Civil Rules 24 (Nov. 17, 2008) (testimony of Richard T. Seymour), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Transcript 111708.pdf ("We all know
from the trials we participated in that there is a world of difference in how an individual presents
testimony, whether it's a trial[] by affidavit[] does not give anyone the sense of ajust result that a
trial with live witnesses would produce.").
60. See ADVISORY COMM., APR. 20 21, 2009, supra note 57, at 127 28 (summarizing the
comments of Thomas J. Crane, Esq., who argued for "should" because summary judgment is
already granted too frequently, particularly in ADA cases): cf id. at 126 (summarizing the
comments of Richard L. Seymour, Esq., who argued that "should" is the proper term and that
"[d]ecisions in the First, Second, and Third Circuits 'have criticized the tendency of district courts
to use summary judgment as a device to clear their dockets rather than to identify and dispose of
hopelessly unmeritorious cases.'" and that "[t]his tendency too will be exacerbated by 'must"');
id. at 136 (summarizing the testimony of Tom Crane, Esq., who noted that "[s]ummary judgment
is overused." and that "[t]here is no need to increase its use by changing to 'must').
61. See id. at 120-69 (summarizing written comments and testimony on proposed rules
published for comment); Hearing Before the Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules (Feb. 2, 2009),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/CV02-2009-tr.pdf;
Hearing Before the Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules (Jan. 14. 2009), available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/FedCtHearing011409.pdf;
Hearing Before the
Advisory Comm, on Civil Rules (Nov. 17, 2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Transcript 111708.pdf.
62. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, MINUTES, APR. 20-21, 2009, at 3 (2009),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV04-2009min.pdf (noting that "shall" was restored by a unanimous vote).
63. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, MINUTES, FEB. 2-3, 2009, at 6 (2009)
[hereinafter ADVISORY COMM., FEB. 2-3, 2009], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CVO2-2009-min.pdf ('Sacred phrases' were carried forward
without change, partly for the reassurance of familiarity but often because any change in
expression might change meaning."); see also Style Guidelines Memo, supra note 44, at xix xx
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Advisory Committee and the Standing Committee concluded that the
statement of the standard-"summary judgment shall be rendered on a
showing that no genuine dispute of material fact existed and the moving
party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law"-was such a sacred
phrase that it had been a mistake to change it as part of the style project
in 2007.64
The 2010 proposal to amend Rule 56 was, of course, not subject to
the don't-change-substantive-meaning limit of the style project. But the
Advisory Committee decided from the outset of its work on what
became the 2010 amendments to Rule 56 not to change the substantive
standard for granting or denying summary judgment, and not to tilt the
rule toward either plaintiffs or defendants. The Committee learned from
the 1992 experience with a proposed amendment that would have both

(noting that "sacred phrases" are different from terms of art such as "hearsay").
64. The Advisory Committee recognized that "[b]y substituting 'should' for 'shall,' the Style
Project may have inadvertently desecrated a sacred phrase." ADVISORY COMM., FEB. 2-3. 2009.
supra note 63, at 6. At its next meeting, the Advisory Committee recommended the restoration of
"shall," explaining that
[i]n February the Committee concluded that "shall" should be restored, despite the
general style convention prohibiting any use of this word. Multiple comments on the
published proposal, which carried forward with "should" from the Style Project, show
unacceptable risks that either of the recognized alternatives, "must" or "should," will
cause a gradual shift of the summary-judgment standard. Brief discussion reconfirmed
by unanimous vote the recommendation to restore "shall."
ADVISORY COMM., APR. 20 21, 2009, supra note 62, at 3. Under Rule 56 as amended in 2010,
"The court shall grant summary judgment .....
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Committee Notes
accompanying the 2010 amendment explained:
"Shall" is restored to express the direction to grant summary judgment. The word
"shall" in Rule 56 acquired significance over many decades of use. Rule 56 was
amended in 2007 to replace "shall" with "should" as part of the Style Project, acting
under a convention that prohibited any use of "shall." Comments on proposals to
amend Rule 56, as published in 2008, have shown that neither of the choices available
under the Style Project conventions "must" or "should"-is suitable in light of the
case law on whether a district court has discretion to deny summary judgment when
there appears to be no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Compare Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) ("Neither do we suggest that the trial
courts should act other than with caution in granting summary judgment or that the trial
court may not deny summary judgment in a case in which there is reason to believe
that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial. Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co..
334 U.S. 249 * * * (1948))," with Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)
("In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.").
Eliminating "shall" created an unacceptable risk of changing the summary-judgment
standard. Restoring "shall" avoids the unintended consequences of any other word.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's notes (2010).
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restated and changed the standard for granting summary judgment and
that frankly intended to promote the use of such motions.6 5 With the
proposals that were published in 2008, the Civil Rules Committee
decided to allow the case law on the standard for granting or denying
such motions to continue to develop around the existing rule statement.
The result is the second major change that wasn't: the decision not to
change "shall" to state the standard for granting summary judgment
when the necessary showing had been made, and the decision not to
change the iconic words that expressed the standard, despite the changes
in case law and practice that had occurred.
While deciding not to change the substantive standard, and instead to
make a change back to "shall" to ensure that no one thought the
standard had been changed, the Civil Rules Committee pursued other
proposals to clarify, simplify, and make consistent the procedures for
bringing and litigating summary judgment motions. Some of them had
been rehearsed in the 1992 proposed amendments. The goals were
much the same as they had been in 1992. They included making the
procedures more consistent across the country, reducing the role of local
rules; recognizing partial summary judgments; and requiring movants
and nonmovants to provide specific citations to the record, relieving
judges of the obligation to behave like ferrets or truffle pigs. 66 The first
goal was the most difficult. About half of the ninety-three districts had
local rules requiring movants to set out the facts that they believed to be
undisputed and that entitled them to summary judgment in separately
numbered paragraphs. Of the fifty-six districts with such rules, twenty
required the nonmovant to respond in kind. The rest of the districts did
not have such a requirement. 6 7 To improve national consistency, the
65. The stated purpose of the proposed 1992 amendment was "to enhance the utility of the
summary judgment procedure." SEPT. 1992 STANDING COMM. REPORT, supra note 22, att. A, at
179 (1992). available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST091992.pdf. See id. att. A, at 170-79, for the full text of the 1992 proposal to amend Rule 56.
66.

See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, MINUTES, APR. 19 20, 2007, at 3-4 (2007),

available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CVO4-2007min.pdf (broadly discussing the reasons for amending Rule 56); Memorandum from Judge Sam
C. Pointer, Jr., Chair of the Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Judge Robert E. Keeton, Chair of
the Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Report of Advisory Comm. on Civil
Rules att. A. at 124-29 (May 1, 1992). available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd
Policies/rules/Reports/CV5-1992.pdf (draft committee note to proposed Rule 56 revisions,
explaining the proposed revisions): see also REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES AND
MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, MAR. 2009 5 7 (2009),

available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST01-2009.pdf
(discussing the rationale behind the proposals to amend Rule 56 in 2008).
67. See Memorandum from Jeffrey Barr & James Ishida to Judge Michael Baylson, Survey of
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2008 proposal included a so-called point-counterpoint provision. The
proposed change would have required the party seeking summary
judgment to file three items: a motion, a statement of the facts that are
asserted to be beyond genuine dispute, and a brief. The response would
have included a submission addressing each stated fact and could
include a statement of additional facts asserted to preclude summary
judgment, along with a brief. The movant could file a reply to any
additional facts stated in the response, again with a brief.68
The 2008 point-counterpoint proposal was similar in some ways to
that in the 1992 draft. It was unclear that the point-counterpoint part of
the 1992 proposed rule revision played a role in the Judicial Conference
decision to reject it. But in 2008, the proposal to make the pointcounterpoint motion and response the default national standard, subject
to a judge's ability to deviate from it by case-specific order but beyond
the ability of a district or division to deviate from it by local rule or
standing or general order, provoked another robust and deeply divided
debate.
Having a default national procedure for filing and responding to
summary judgment motions was important if the rule was to achieve
national uniformity. National uniformity was one of the singular

Dist. Court Local Summary Judgment Rules, in Memorandum from Judge Lee H. Rosenthal.
Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to Judge David F. Levi. Chair,
Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Comm.
110-12 (May 25. 2007) [hereinafter May 2007 Civil Rules Report], available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV05-2007.pdf (discussing a
review of ninety-two district courts regarding local summary judgment rules).
68. In relevant part, the proposed amendments to Rule 56(c) that were published in 2008
provided:
(2) Motion. The motion must:
(A) describe each claim, defense, or issue as to which summary judgment is
sought; and
(B) state in separately numbered paragraphs only those material facts that the
movant asserts are not genuinely in dispute and entitle the movant to judgment as
a matter of law.
(3) Response. A response:
(A) must, by correspondingly numbered paragraphs. accept. qualify, or denyeither generally or for purposes of the motion only-each fact in the Rule
56(c)(2)(B) statement;
(B) may state that those facts do not support judgment as a matter of law; and
(C) may state additional facts that preclude summary judgment.
(4) Reply. The movant may reply to any additional fact stated in the response in the
form required for a response.
Id at 66-67.
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achievements of the Federal Rules in 1938.69 But in the years since,
local rules have proliferated. Of course, there are local variations in
docket mix and conditions and in the culture of the bench and bar.
These variations, often reflected in local rules, are important. And there
is the individual discretion of judges to manage their own dockets in the
way that works best for them. This individual discretion, often reflected
in individual-judge rules, or "local-local" rules, is an important aspect
of judicial independence and creativity. On the other hand, a national
judicial system meant to have a nationally consistent set of procedural
rules should not have radically different procedures from district to
district in such an important area as summary judgment. Lawyers
complain that they have to deal with very different practices among the
courts. 70 Judges may not be fully aware of the problem that numerous
and varying local rules present for out-of-district practitioners, or for
local practitioners who are more familiar with state than federal courts.
And many of the local-rule variations do not reflect, and are not caused
by, differences in local practice or docket conditions. Instead, the
variations may arise and persist from habit or from comfort with the
familiar. But the Civil Rules Committee was unwilling to impose any
particular approach as the national standard without confidence that it
would be workable and fair on a national basis. The public comments
on point-counterpoint undermined that confidence.
During the public-comment period on the proposed amendments to
Rule 56 published in 2008, it became clear that imposing the pointcounterpoint procedure as the default national standard would be

69. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil
Procedure. 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 1394 (1992) (describing how the Rules established
uniformity); see also Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedurein Decline, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 494, 503-04 (1986) (discussing the desire of the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to create uniformity in federal practice): Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local
Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging ProceduralPatterns, 137 U. PA.
L. REv. 1999, 2002-06 (1989) (discussing arguments advanced in favor of uniformity during the
creation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the four "strands" of the "'uniform federal
rules' theme": interdistrict court uniformity, intrastate uniformity, transsubstantive uniformity,
and uniformity of result).
70. Cf Gregory C. Sisk. The Balkanization of Appellate Justice: The Proliferation of Local
Rules in the Federal Circuits, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1. 26-30 (1997) (using federal appellate
practice as an example to show that complying with local rules impairs the quality and increases
the cost of litigation, since lawyers must spend time discovering. understanding. and ensuring
their compliance with local rules); Subrin, supra note 69. at 2020-26 (examining the wideranging differences among rules of court, highlighting rules regulating discovery and deposition
practices). See generally Steven Flanders, Local Rules in Federal District Courts: Usurpation,
Legislation, or Information?, 14 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 213. 214-16 (1981) (discussing the
promulgation of local rules in federal courts and the problems they create in practice).
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viewed as favoring defendants at the expense of plaintiffs. 7 1 Lawyers
representing plaintiffs, who are not always, but often, opposing
summary judgment motions, argued that having to respond to individual
paragraphs identifying facts asserted to be undisputed and entitling the
movant to relief, in correspondingly numbered individual paragraphs,
imposed yet another burden on the unrepresented and the
underrepresented who were already at a disadvantage in summary
judgment practice. 72 These lawyers also argued that the pointcounterpoint procedure often prevented them from telling their client's
story in a way that allowed the inferences as well as the facts to become
clear. Instead, point-counterpoint disaggregated-sliced and diced-the
evidence in a way that helped defendants and made summary judgment
easier to grant. In other words, the lawyers argued, the pointcounterpoint procedure could itself affect the substantive standard for
71.
See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM., APR. 20-21, 2009, supra note 57, at 120 (describing
comments of Professor Elizabeth M. Schneider: "The detailed statement and response procedure
may aggravate an already unsatisfactory situation" in civil rights and employment discrimination
cases); id. at 121 (describing the comments of L. Stephen Platt, Esq.:'"[I]n practice the courts are
treating the plaintiff as still having the burden of proof in opposing summary judgment motions
and the courts improperly take the inferences in favor of the moving party.... [T]he Committee
should move in the direction of limiting the one-sidedness (i.e., favoring the moving party) of the
current rule."' (alterations in original)): id. (describing the comments of Ellen J. Messing, Esq.:
'[T]he Committee should move in a different direction [from point-counterpoint procedure]. It
should take appropriate steps to limit the abuse of summary judgment motions in civil rights and
other cases where the parties are disproportionate in resources."' (alterations in original)); id. at
122 (describing the comments of Cynthia L. Pollick, Esq.: "The comment urges that the present
system is hard enough, the proposed amendments would make it harder for everyday citizens,
leaving unfortunate long-lasting impressions about the federal justice system.") id. at 123
(summarizing the testimony of Hon. Royal Furgeson: "'Summary judgment fundamentally alters
the balance of power between plaintiffs and defendants by raising both the cost and risk to
plaintiffs in the pretrial phases of litigation, while diminishing both for defendants. . . .
[S]ummary judgment, as we have it today, has created an unlevel playing field.' The procedure
should not be further complicated by adding point-counterpoint." (alterations in original)).
72. See, e.g., id. at 140 (summarizing the comments of Joseph D. Garrison. Esq.: "The
problem with detailed statements is that some lawyers defending individual employment cases
make abusive submissions detailing hundreds of facts, imposing inappropriate burdens on the
small firms that often represent plaintiffs."); id. at 143 (summarizing the comments of Professor
Elizabeth M. Schneider: "Expresses concern that the proposed point-counterpoint procedure will
have a particularly adverse impact on employment discrimination and other civil rights actions.");
id. at 145 (summarizing the comments of L. Steven Platt, Esq.: "The point-counterpoint system
used in the Illinois district where Mr. Platt practices 'doesn't work and unfairly favors
defendants.' ... "The point-counterpoint system is, for many reasons, 'biased against plaintiffs
and their lawyers in civil rights cases."'): id. at 146 (summarizing the comments of Ellen J.
Messing. Esq., which stated that "'[flrom our perspective as plaintiffs' civil rights lawyers, this
system is an unmitigated disaster"'); id at 157 (summarizing the testimony of John Vail, Esq.,
who noted that summary judgment is most often used by defendants, and that the proposed
procedure would prevent plaintiffs, who carry the trial burden, from effectively creating a
narrative).
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granting summary judgment in a way that adversely affected
plaintiffs. 7 3
The benefit of having district and division local rules serve as
laboratory experiments to test different approaches also became clear.
Lawyers with experience in districts or divisions with pointcounterpoint local rules gave mixed reviews of how well the procedure
worked. Lawyers-on both sides of the "v."-emphasized that without
effective judicial control and management, the statements of undisputed
facts could grow to mammoth proportions, defeating the intended
efficiency. 74 Other lawyers praised the procedure and emphasized how
well it had worked in their cases. And though it is not common to have
judges speak out against rule proposals, that happened here. Judges in
districts that had tried point-counterpoint and abandoned it came to ask
the Civil Rules Committee not to recommend a change to Rule 56 that
would impose the procedure on a national basis. 75 Judges with
73. See, e.g., id. at 148 (summarizing the comments of Sharon J. Arkin, Esq.: "Pointcounterpoint 'is ... very disturbing ... because it encourages defendants to set forth excessive,
unnecessary facts that must be addressed by the plaintiff in a painstaking piecemeal way."'); id. at
148-49 (summarizing the comments of Stefano G. Moscato, Esq., for the National Employment
Lawyers Association, who explained the problems with districts using the point-counterpoint
procedure, including that "[t]he real merits get lost in the shuffle"): id. at 149 (summarizing the
comments of March Buchanan, Esq.: "Experience in employment discrimination law shows that
the point-counterpoint procedure 'would be nothing more than abusive, in that it allows the
defendant to select the theme of the motion, and prevents the plaintiff . . . from submitting
reasonable inferences from the facts."'); id at 152 (summarizing the comments of Karen K.
Fitzgerald, Esq.: '[T]he point-counterpoint system makes it even more difficult for the plaintiff
to adequately correct some of the subtle misconceptions because the plaintiff is forced to respond
within the confines of the defendant's stated version of the story.' The plaintiff should be
allowed to tell the story in a persuasive way." (alteration in original)).
74. See, e.g., id. at 150 (summarizing the comments of Jeffrey J. Greenbaum, Esq.: "[1]n many
instances [point-counterpoint statements] are misunderstood or are misused 'to overburden the
other side with the need to respond to . . . far too numerous, detailed and complex fact
statements."'): id. at 151 (summarizing the comments of Margaret A. Harris, Esq.: "'The
proposed rule is unwieldy and would result in an inordinate increase in the amount of time spent
by counsel . . . and, more importantly, result in the district court receiving, at minimum, four
additional (and lengthy) documents that must be checked and cross-checked against one
another."'); id. at 154 (summarizing the comments of Allen D. Black, Esq.: "Point-counterpoint
'imposes an enormous amount of unproductive busywork on both the parties and the Court.' In
complex cases the statements 'almost universally list hundreds of facts . .. many of which have
only tangential impact on the core dispute. The non-moving party is then compelled to contest or
at least re-case hundreds of peripheral facts ....
"); id. at 157 (summarizing the testimony of
Joseph Garrison. Esq., who explained that "there are motions that abuse the procedure by stating
too many undisputed facts, including 'supposed material facts which are not at issue'").
75. See, e.g., id. at 140 (summarizing the comments of Hon. G. Patrick Murphy:
[T]his
procedure was tried in our court by local rule and it proved to be a waste of time.' . . . The
amendment will be a disaster; 'don't do it."'); id. at 144-45 (summarizing the comments of Hon.
Claudia Wilken, who explained that since her district abandoned point-counterpoint procedures,
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experience in both districts with it and without it made similar pleas. A
judge who had extensive experience with summary judgment motions in
districts with a point-counterpoint local rule and in districts with no
such rule, from regularly serving in different courts, reported on the
results of what turned out to be a nicely controlled experiment. 76 The
direct comparison did not yield favorable reviews for the pointcounterpoint procedure. 7 7 Yet other judges in districts with a local rule
requiring point-counterpoint presentation of summary judgment
motions and responses praised its benefits and emphasized that it made
deciding summary judgment motions faster and better. 78 The Civil
Rules Committee added to this information a study performed by the
Federal Judicial Center on differences in the results and time to
disposition between the districts that required point-counterpoint and
those that did not.7 9
At the end of the day, the Civil Rules Committee decided not to
pursue the published proposal for point-counterpoint. There were a
number of changes to the summary judgment rule proposed that were
enacted in 2010,80 but they did not include a national system of a point'we have found the summary judgment motion practice to be much improved"'): id. at 146
(summarizing the comments of Hon. Robert L. Miller, Jr., who wrote for all the District and
Magistrate Judges of the Northern District of Indiana. which abandoned its own pointcounterpoint procedure because it "'led to too much satellite briefing, such as motions to strike
for non-compliance with the requirement"'); cf id. at 152 (summarizing the comments of Hon.
Janice Stewart. who noted that the District of Oregon has a point-counterpoint procedure that she
waives and that "has generated widespread dissatisfaction").
76. See id at 140-41 (summarizing the comments of Hon. John W. Sedwick, who had
experience in both the District of Alaska, which did not use point-counterpoint, and the District of
Arizona, which did use point-counterpoint); see also id. at 141 (summarizing the comments of
Hon. H. Russel Holland).
77. See id. at 140-41 (summarizing the comments of Hon. John W. Sedwick, who described
numerous problems with the point-counterpoint procedure) see also id. at 141 (summarizing the
comments of Hon. H. Russel Holland. who joined Judge Sedwick's comments and stated that
"[a]s compared to Alaska, the Arizona local Rule 56 practice is 'not compatible with' the
purposes of Rule 1").
78. See, e.g.. id. at 147 (summarizing the comments of Hon. Timothy J. Savage, who
supported the proposed revisions); id. at 155 (summarizing the testimony of Hon. Robert E.
Payne, noting that a local rule in his district that implemented a similar procedure was helpful to
focus the briefing, provided that it was coupled with another rule limiting the length of briefs
(which include the statements of undisputed facts, and the responses to those statements)); cf id.
at 147 (summarizing the comments of Hon. Barbara B. Crabb, who noted that she finds a similar
procedure in the Western District of Wisconsin to be very helpful, but suggesting that it not be
written into the national rule).
79. See Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort to Judge Michael Baylson, Report on
Summary Judgment Practice Across Districts with Variations in Local Rules (Aug. 13. 2008).
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sujulrs2.pdf/$file/sujulrs2.pdf.
80. The amendments that took effect in 2010 drew from many summary judgment provisions
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counterpoint procedure. The local-rule variations could continue to
operate in this area, at the expense of national consistency.
Part of this discussion was about national consistency as opposed to
local-rule variations, a rulemaking theme that goes back to the mid1930s. Since 1938, there has been a national rule stating the standard
for when to grant or deny summary judgment. That is obviously
critical; national uniformity is essential in stating the procedural rules
that also define parties' rights. Briefing procedures are not in that
category. One issue was whether this briefing procedure was in a
second category, in which a consistent approach is more important than
what the approach is, or in a third category, in which consistency is less
important but the Committee has confidence it has picked the best rule
and therefore can make it the national rule. Point-counterpoint did not
fit into these categories or pass any of these criteria. It did not have to
be a nationally uniform standard and the Committee was not confident
that, to use Professor Carrington's words, what it proposed as the
default national standard was "right." So the Committee opted not to
make the change. This is the third change that wasn't. Like the first
two changes that weren't, it exemplified, and resulted from, a robust,
transparent, and highly effective process under the Rules Enabling Act.
In both 1992 and in 2010, when substantial revisions of Rule 56 were
thoroughly studied, the Civil Rules Committee decided not to
recommend changes that would alter the rule text describing the
common in local rules. For example, the amendments adopted a provision that required a party
asserting a fact that cannot be genuinely disputed to provide a "pinpoint citation" to the record.
Some of the other changes made by the 2010 amendments included: restoring "shall" to express
the direction to grant summary judgment when the standard is met; indicating that the court
should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying a motion for summary judgment;
recognizing that a party may submit an unsworn written declaration, certificate, verification, or
statement under penalty of perjury in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as a substitute for an
affidavit to support or oppose a summary judgment motion; providing courts with options when
an assertion of fact has not been properly supported by the moving party or responded to by the
opposing party, including considering the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion, granting
summary judgment if supported by the motion and supporting materials, or affording the party an
opportunity to amend the motion setting a time, subject to variation by local rule or court order in
a case, for a party to file a summary judgment motion; explicitly recognizing that courts may
enter partial summary judgments; and providing that after giving notice and a reasonable time to
respond. a court may grant summary judgment for the nonmoving party. grant a motion on legal
or factual grounds not raised by the parties, or consider summary judgment on its own. See
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, TO THE
CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES AND MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE

UNITED STATES, SEPT. 2009, at 14-15 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/Combined ST Report Sept 2009.pdf
(emphasizing
the
importance of trial courts having some discretion in handling motions for partial summary
judgment); FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's notes (2010).
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substantive standard. In 2010, the Committee decided not to make a
change in briefing requirements-a change that on its face seemed only
procedural-in part for fear that it could affect how the substantive
standard worked by making it harder for certain categories of cases or
litigants to litigate summary judgment motions. And in 2010, the Civil
Rules and Standing Rules Committees decided to revert to a word that
had been different for three years to avoid changing the substantive
standard. The decision not to change the Rule 56 text setting out the
standard for granting summary judgment was made in the face of
significant criticism that the rule as drafted was indeterminate and
unfair as a result of Supreme Court cases interpreting that text. The
circumstances and nature of the criticism are similar to some of the
reactions to Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly8 ' and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,82
the 2007 and 2009 Supreme Court cases interpreting Rule 8 pleading
requirements. 83 What do the decisions not to change the Rule 56 text
describing the substantive standard for granting summary judgment
motions, and the decisions to avoid other changes in the rule that could
affect the standard, tell us first about summary judgment and, second,
about the Rules Enabling Act?
The Rule 56 text, like the Rule 8 text, has proven enduring.
Following Supreme Court decisions interpreting these rule texts, the
Rules Committees looked hard at alternatives and concluded, after years
of work, that they have not yet arrived at different formulations that are
better and worth risking. The Rule 56 text has endured because its
seemingly indeterminate standard is problematic only if the text is
viewed apart from the common-law system in which it operates. The
combination of the iconic rule text with the common law that has
developed over time, emerging from many different cases, prevents the
81. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
82. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
83. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised A Comment on
Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 849, 850 (2010) ("Twombly's critics-and there are
many-complain that the plausibility standard unfairly impedes court access for meritorious suits.
... [Iqbal] ... applies the plausibility standard to allegations that are less obviously deficient than
those in Twombly and, in so doing, signals an even stricter approach to pleading requirements.
Provoked by the Iqbal decision, many critics now believe that it is imperative to undo the effects
of plausibility pleading."); Kevin Clermont & Stephen Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing
Systems, 95 IOWAL. REv. 821. 840-41 (2010) (arguing that Twombly and Iqbal created a de facto
obligation on defense counsel to make a motion to dismiss and that plaintiffs are burdened with
bearing the cost of defending these motions). See generally A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding
Pleading Doctrine. 108 MICH. L. REv. 1, 27 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court's
interpretation of Rule 8 in Twombly and Iqbal will unfairly deny court access to certain types of
plaintiffs).
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unguided judicial discretion the critics decry and fear. It is that
combination that makes Rule 56, and a variety of other rules, endure
and function across a variety of subject matters and of factual patterns
within the same subject matter. The Judicial Conference in 1992
rejected an effort to make the summary judgment standard more
determinate because of nervousness about the effect of changing the
words that had stood for so long. In 2010, the Rules Committees
eschewed any change to the standard as stated in the text, and reversed
the 2007 change, because the Committees concluded that the text has,
and will, allow the common law to develop in a nuanced and contextspecific fashion. That conclusion is the first lesson from the three
changes that weren't. The first lesson is that the Rules Committees not
only may, but should, and sometimes must, embrace the power and
promise of the common law to add nuance and context to the rules in
ways that adding or changing rule text simply cannot achieve.
And what do the changes that weren't tell us about the process of
making or amending rules? The 1992 and the 2010 rule changes
involved many of the difficult challenges of that process. The
Committees grappled with the tension between national uniformity and
local rules; between textual specificity to limit judicial discretion and
reliance on common law to guide that discretion; and between the role
of the judge and the role of the jury. And throughout the Rule 56 work,
just as with the Rule 8 and Rule 12 work done after Twombly and Iqbal,
the Rules Committees had to think hard about the right relationship of
the four columns of the rules-pleading, discovery, early disposition,
and trial.
In the work that led to the rule changes that weren't, the Rules
Enabling Act process worked well. The Rules Committees gathered
information in a disciplined and thorough way, through miniconferences
in advance of formal rulemaking, through a robust public comment
period, and through empirical study. The Committees took a hard and
transparent look at what the information showed. Through three public
hearings and many written comments on the 2008 proposal to amend
Rule 56, the Rules Committees listened carefully to the views of people
with very different ideas and made changes to the proposed rule as a
result. There was no stubborn adherence to what was published or a
determination to do something, simply because a great deal of time and
effort had been invested. To the contrary, there was an honest
assessment of the public comments and the flaws and warts they
revealed in the published proposals. The public comment process is
critical to rulemaking. The recognition of this is nowhere more
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apparent than in the summary judgment changes that weren't. The
changes to Rule 56-perhaps especially the changes that weren'treveal reason to be very optimistic about the state of rulemaking for our
federal courts. That is the second lesson from the three changes that
were not.
The conversations about the right response to the trilogy, as with the
right response to Twombly and Iqbal, are in part conversations about the
Rules Enabling Act process. That process works well in part because
the Rules Committees have carefully avoided being either political or
politicized. The transparency of the last several decades, boosted by the
internet, has helped. The commitment to empirical research also helps.
And the Rules Committees have credibly made clear their commitment
to continuing to monitor the rules to be sure that the decision not to
amend remains the right choice. The Committees are vigilant and
patient monitors of how the rules are operating in practice. The
Committees will continue to watch how Rule 56 operates and if a
problem emerges, the Committees will act with the tools the Rules
Enabling Act provides.
The final and third lesson from the Rule 56 changes that weren't was
best said by one of the most eloquent participants in the Rules
Committees, Benjamin Kaplan. 84 He wrote:
No one, I suppose, expects of a Rule that it shall solve its problems
fully and forever. Indeed, if the problems are real ones, they can never
be solved. We are merely under the duty of trying continually to solve
them. 85
This is a good way to describe what the Rules Committees
understood was their task in working on Rule 56, in the early 1990s and

84. Benjamin Kaplan was the Royall Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and a former
justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. He also served on the Massachusetts Court
of Appeals. He was a specialist in copyright law and civil procedure, and he served as the
Reporter for the Civil Rules Advisory Committee from 1960 to 1966. Supreme Court Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that "Benjamin Kaplan was [her] wise, witty, and most engaging
teacher, [her] instructor through his lucid speech and writings to this very day, [her] model of
what a great teacher and jurist should be." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Memoriam: Benjamin
Kaplan, 124 HARv. L. REv. 1349. 1349 (2011). Professor Arthur R. Miller, another participant in
the Rules Committees' work, has stated: "Benjamin Kaplan was my mentor and role model, not
simply in law school but for the better part of my professional life." Arthur R. Miller, In
Memoriam: Benjamin Kaplan, 124 HARv. L. REv. 1354. 1354 (2011). In describing his work as
assistant reporter to the Civil Rules Committee while Benjamin Kaplan was the reporter,
Professor Miller stated: "As draft gave way to draft I felt like an apprentice to a craftsman. Ben
could rotate the language of a potential rule provision as one would a diamond in the sunlight and
see its flaws and imperfections. We polished endlessly." Id. at 1357.
85. Benjamin Kaplan, A PrepatoryNote, 10 B.C. L. REv. 497, 500 (1969).
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in 2008 to 2010. For the really tough problems-and when to grant
summary judgment is that kind of problem-there are no final fixes.
There is instead a problem that needs loving and constant effort. The
decisions not to change Rule 56, but instead allow the common law to
continue to evolve based on the familiar text, all the while studying how
that evolution proceeds, is in this spirit. So, indeed, is this Symposium.

